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1 Introduction   
 
There is already a vast literature on technology licensing examining the rationale for 
licensing process innovations in the imperfectly competitive market. One common 
problem faced by the licenser is the threat of imitation by the licensee. While licensing 
the technology, the licenser then needs to internalize this threat of imitation and needs to 
design its licensing contract accordingly. These issues and related issues have been 
already discussed in the literature. When imitation is easy, one main conclusion of the 
previous papers is that licensing will take place if the technological differences between 
the licenser and the licensee are not sufficiently large. In other words, we would expect 
licensing by the relatively lower cost-efficient firms and not by the sufficiently higher 
cost-efficient firms (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and Marjit, 1990). However, the 
previous papers on licensing have reached to the above conclusion under the assumption 
that both the licenser and licensee are perfectly aware of the type of the licensed 
technology. That is, the previous papers have considered the game of complete 
information.  
The purpose of this paper is to show that the above result on technology 
licensing could be reversed when the quality of the licensed technology is private 
information of the licenser. In particular, we show that there are situations where 
licensing will take place for sufficiently large technological differences between the 
licenser and the licensee but not for sufficiently small technological differences between 
the licenser and the licensee. We show that this result holds for those parametric 
configurations for which licensing is not profitable under complete information game. 
Thus, we find that there could be an upward bias on technology licensing.
1 
  In what follows, in the next section we will consider a Cournot duopoly with 
asymmetric cost of production. We assume that the firm with lower cost of production 
has private information about its cost of production while the other firm’s cost of 
production is common knowledge. One may think of a situation where initially both 
firms had same cost of production and one of them had invented a new production 
technology, whose quality is private information. For simplicity, we assume that the cost 
of the lower cost firm may be  l c  or  h c , where  h l c c < . However, both  l c  and  h c  are 
lower than the cost of production of the other firm. While direct inspection will help to 
verify the quality of the technology of the lower cost firm, this will also allow the higher 
cost firm to imitate the technology of the lower cost firm.
 2   We show that this 
                                                 
1 In a recent paper Schmitz (2002) has shown a different type of upward bias on technology licensing. In 
that paper Schmitz has shown that if the licensees have private information about the benefits of using the 
licensed technology then number of licenses may be increased compared to the situation where the 
benefits of the licensees from the licensed technology is complete information. Unlike Schmitz (2002), 
this paper considers private information of the licenser and also considers a situation where the licenser 
and licensee compete in the product market.    
2 We will assume that non-infringing imitation or ‘inventing around’ is permissible.  2
informational problem could be solved through technology licensing and may encourage 
the lower cost firm to license its technology even for those parametric configurations 
where licensing is not optimal under complete information game. However, in this 
situation, the lower cost firm will license its technology provided its cost of production 
is  l c . Licensing will encourage more competition from the licensee but will also help 
the lower cost firm to increase its market share by eliminating the informational 
problem. Licensing is profitable if the latter effect dominates the former. Since licensing 
eliminates the problem of asymmetric information, the lower cost firm with cost of 
production  h c  will not license for those parametric configurations where licensing is 
unprofitable under complete information. This is because licensing by the lower cost 
firm with cost of production  h c  does not raise the market share of this type of lower cost 
firm.
3 
  Thus, we show that the presence of asymmetric information regarding the quality 
of the technology increases the possibility of licensing and hence, higher cost efficiency 
in the industry. This higher cost efficiency increases social welfare under incomplete 
information compared to complete information.    
  Rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model and the result 




Suppose there are two firms, called 1 and 2. These firms produce a homogeneous 
product. Assume that firm 1 has a technology to produce the product that corresponds to 
the constant average cost of production c and is known to both firms. We assume that 
the production technology of firm 2 is private information.  For simplicity, we assume 
that the production technology of firm 2 can be one of two types, viz., low cost 
technology or high cost technology. Assume that the low cost technology corresponds to 
the constant average cost of production  l c  and the high cost technology corresponds to 
the constant average cost of production  h c , where  c c c h l < < . While firm 2 knows its 
cost of production perfectly, firm 1 knows that the cost of production of firm 2 will be 
either  l c  with probability  p  or  h c  with probability  ) 1 ( p − . We assume that both firms 
know this probability distribution. As mentioned in the introduction, innovation by firm 
2 may be the reason for generating a new technology by firm 2, whose quality is not 
perfectly known to firm 1. However, we assume that while firm 1 does not know the 
exact quality of firm 2’s technology, direct inspection by either firm 1 or a third party 
verifier can verify the technology of firm 2. 
                                                 
3 Unlike the present paper there are some papers on licensing under asymmetric information where 
licenser and licensee do not compete in the same market. For these works, one may refer to Gallini and 
Wright (1990), Beggs (1992), Singh (1992), Poddar and Sinha (2002) and Schmitz (2002).   
  3
  Assume that the inverse market demand function is given by 
 
q P − =1 ,                    ( 1 )  
 
where the notations have usual meaning. Throughout the analysis we will assume that 
1 2 − > c cl . This restriction guarantees that firm 1 always gets positive profit 
irrespective of the cost of production of firm 2. Hence, the market becomes duopoly 
always.  
  We consider the following game. In stage 1, firm 2 decides whether to license its 
technology to firm 1. Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), Marjit (1990), Mukherjee 
(2001) and many others, we assume that, in case of licensing, firm 2 licenses its 
technology against an up-front fixed fee.
4 Further, we assume that firm 2 gives a take-it-
or-leave-it licensing offer to firm 1. Conditional on the decision on technology 
licensing, in stage 2, these firms choose their outputs as Cournot duopolists. We solve 
the game through backward induction. 
 
2.1 Complete  information  game 
 
Before going to examine the problem of licensing under asymmetric information, in this 
subsection we briefly review the possibility of technology licensing under complete 
information game. That is, we look at the condition for profitable technology licensing if 
the cost of production of firm 2 is perfectly known to firm 1. 
 
Proposition 1: If the constant average cost of production of firm 1 and firm 2 are c and 
k c  respectively, where k  is either l or h, then technology licensing against up-front 
fixed fee will occur if and only if  3
2 5 − >
c
k c.  
 
One can find the above result in Marjit (1990). Since the proof of this 
proposition is similar to Marjit (1990) we are omitting the proof here. Therefore, if, 
under complete information, firm 2 does not license its technology when it has a 
technology corresponding to  h c , firm 2 will not license its technology if it has a 
technology corresponding to  l c . In other words, given the value of c, if both  l c  and  h c  
are less than  3
2 5 − c  then licensing will not occur in the complete information game. In the 
following analysis we will focus on this situation where licensing is not profitable under 
complete information, i.e., we will assume that both  l c  and  h c  are less than  3
2 5 − c .  
 
                                                 
4 The ability of the licensee to imitate or ‘invent around’ the technology of the licenser costlessly after 
getting the licensed technology or the lack of information about the licensee’s output necessary to make an 
output royalty contract can restrict the licenser to offer a fixed fee licensing contract.  4
2.2  Problem of asymmetric information 
 
In this subsection we will consider the equilibrium of the asymmetric information game 
described at the beginning of this section. Further, as mentioned already, we will focus 
on the situation where  l c  and  h c  are less than  3
2 5 − c  as this is enough for the purpose of 
this paper.   
   There are three possible ways by which this problem of asymmetric information 
could be solved. Firstly, firm 2 can go to a third party verifier to verify the quality of its 
technology and reveal this report. However, this procedure might involve two types of 
problems. Firm 2 could collude with the third party to get a report in its favor and gets 
the strategic advantage in the product market. Even if firm 2 and the third party do not 
collude there is still the possibility of collusion between the third party and firm 1. Third 
party verifier could pass the information about firm 2’s technology to firm 1 against a 
monetary transfer. If imitation is not costly to firm 1 then firm 1 can use this information 
to ‘invent around’ or doing non-infringing imitation. This imitation possibility will help 
firm 1 to get the advantage of the better technology of firm 2. Thus, this possibility of 
collusion between the verifier and a firm creates a similar problem of Tirole (1986), 
where he has examined the possibility of collusion in organizations. Hence, the 
possibility of collusion between the third party verifier and a firm would make this 
process of information revelation ineffective. 
  Second way of solving this asymmetric information problem is through direct 
inspection. But, if imitation is not costly then direct inspection of the technology will 
induce firm 1 to imitate the technology of firm 2. In our following analysis we will 
consider that firm 1 can imitate the technology of firm 2 easily once firm 1 gets the 
technology of firm 2. In particular, to show the result of this paper in the simplest way, 
we will assume that imitation is costless. Hence, direct inspection will allow firm 1 to 
produce with this imitated technology by avoiding any payment to firm 2. This 
possibility makes direct inspection as an unattractive option. 
Even if the previous two procedures were ineffective, the third possibility, viz., 
licensing by firm 2 may be the way to solve this informational problem. While licensing 
helps firm 2 to inform firm 1 about the true quality of its technology, licensing also 
allows firm 2 to increase its profit through licensing fee. However, as already noted in 
the literature, if imitation is costless then licensing fee will be restricted to an up-front 
fixed fee only. This benefit of information revelation may increase firm 2’s incentive for 
licensing. More specifically, we would show that even if licensing was not optimal 
under complete information game, licensing could be optimal under this asymmetric 
information problem and firm 2 will license its technology only if it has a technology 




2.2.1  An equilibrium under asymmetric information 
 
In this subsection we will show that the above game has an equilibrium where firm 2 
will license only if it is relatively more technologically superior. This will provide a 
scenario opposite to the complete information game. 
Let us consider the following strategy and belief structure that will constitute the 
separating equilibrium of this game. Consider that firm 2 will license its technology to 
firm 1 if its average cost of production is  l c  but will not license its technology to firm 1 
if its average cost of production is  h c . Further consider that if licensing does not occur 
then firm 1 correctly believes that the cost of production of firm 2 is  h c .  
  Let us first consider the payoff of firm 2 having the technology corresponding to 
l c . Under the equilibrium strategy and belief mentioned above, profit of firm 1 and firm 
2 under non-licensing and licensing will be, respectively 
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where  l F  is the fixed fee under licensing by firm 2 having the technology corresponding 
to  l c . 
Next, consider the situation if firm 2 has the cost of production equal to  h c . 
Under the equilibrium strategy and belief mentioned above, profit of firm 1 and firm 2 
under no licensing and licensing will be, respectively 
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2 π ,         (5) 
 
where  h F  is the fixed fee under licensing by firm 2 having the technology corresponding 
to  h c .   6
If licensing does not occur then it will induce firm 1 to believe that firm 2’s cost 
of production is  h c , irrespective of the true cost of firm 2. This belief structure will 
generate the profits shown in (2) and (4). 
  Now, look at the payoffs under licensing. It is easy to understand that if firm 2 
has the technology corresponding to  l c  then, under licensing, it has no incentive to 
pretend like a firm having the technology corresponding to  h c . But, under licensing, 
firm 2 having the technology corresponding to  h c  has the incentive to pretend like a 
firm having the technology corresponding to  l c , as it will help this type of firm 2 to 
extract higher price for its technology. However, as the technology of firm 2 can be 
verified by a third party verifier, firm 1 can prove this misreport by firm 2 and can 
cancel the licensing contract made by these firms. Moreover, the possibility of imitation 
by firm 1 after getting the licensed technology implies that if this licensing contract is 
being cancelled, firm 1 does not have any further incentive to renew this contract 
according to true nature of the technology. Because the ability to imitate the technology 
allows firm 1 to imitate the technology of firm 1 and produce with the imitated 
technology. Hence, this misreport will make firm 2 worse off. As a result, firm 2 will 
have no incentive to misreport about the quality of its technology even if it has the 
technology corresponding to  h c .
5 
It is trivial that firm 1 will accept a licensing offer if it does not make firm 1 
worse off under licensing compared to non-licensing. Since we have assumed that 
3
2 5 − <
c
h c , it is easy to check from (4) and (5) that firm 2 will not license its technology 
to firm 1. Because then there is no price for the technology that will make both firms 
profitable under licensing compared to non-licensing. 
Now consider the incentive for licensing by firm 2 having a technology 
corresponding to  l c . From (2) and (3) we find that here licensing will be profitable to 
both firms provided  
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5 As we have mentioned the amount of fixed fee charged by the different types of firm 2 could be 
different. However, if the technology of firm 2 could not be verified by a third party verifier, then fixed 
fee charged by different types of firm 2 must be same under a separating equilibrium.    7
Combining (6) and (7) and rearranging we find that licensing is profitable to both firms 
provided 
 
0 ) 2 4 2 )( 3 4 2 ( ) 2 3 2 ( ) 1 ( 8
2 2 > + − − + − − − + − − − h h l h l l c c c c c c c c c .                  (8) 
 
  It is easy to check that condition (8) does not hold for  l h c c = . Next, consider the 
situation for maximal difference between  l c  and  h c , i.e., where  1 2 − = c cl  and 
3
2 5 − =
c
h c . We find that condition (8) is being satisfied when  1 2 − = c cl  and  3
2 5 − =
c
h c . 
Left hand side of (8) is increasing in  h c  over  ] , [ 3
2 5 − c
l c . Therefore, firm 2 having the cost 
of production  l c  finds it optimal to reveal the information about its technology through 
licensing to firm 1 if the difference between  l c  and  h c  is sufficiently large. Thus, we 
find that if there is a problem of asymmetric information, we may observe licensing by 
firms with relatively higher technological superiority but not with relatively lower 
technological superiority. 
  We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose  l c  and  h c  are less than  3
2 5 − c . If the difference between  l c  and 
h c  is sufficiently large then we have an equilibrium where firm 2 licenses its technology 
only if it has a technology corresponding to  l c .  
  
It must be noted that there could be another possibility where neither type of firm 
2 licenses its technology. In this situation, firm 1 considers that firm 2 has the cost of 
production  h l c p pc c ) 1 ( ~ − + = . In this situation, firm 2 having the technology 
corresponding to  l c  will not prefer to license its technology provided we have 
 
0 ) ~ 2 4 2 )( ~ 3 4 2 ( ) ~ 2 3 2 ( ) 1 ( 8
2 2 < + − − + − − − + − − − c c c c c c c c c l l l .            (9) 
 
Left hand side of (9) coincides with the left hand side of (8) when  0 = p  and as we have 
noted, in this situation, condition (9) will not hold when the difference between  l c  and 
h c  are sufficiently large. It can also be found that if  1 = p  then condition (9) holds 
always. Since the left hand side of (9) is continuous and decreasing in  p , it implies that 
there exists a critical value of  p , say 
* p , such that if 
* p p <  then there always exists 
the value of  l c  and  h c  for which condition (9) does not hold. Therefore, for 
* p p < , 
firm 2 having the technology corresponding to  l c  will prefer to license its technology to 
firm 1. However, firm 2 having the technology corresponding to  h c  will still prefer not 
to license its technology.  8
Thus, we find that if 
* p p >  then firm 2 with cost  l c  receives higher profit if it 
is treated like a firm with cost c ~  compared to the equilibrium profit under the 
equilibrium strategy and belief underlying Proposition 2. Therefore, in this situation, the 
equilibrium belief underlying the result of Proposition 2, i.e., non-licensing implies that 
firm 2 has the technology corresponding to  h c  is not a reasonable belief to consider and 
hence, the result mentioned in Proposition 2 looses its importance. But, if 
* p p <  then 
firm 2 with cost  l c  gets higher profit under the equilibrium in Proposition 2 compared 
to the situation where it is being treated as a firm with cost c ~ . So, for 
* p p < , it is 
reasonable to consider that if non-licensing happens then firm 2 has the technology 
corresponding to  h c . Therefore, if 
* p p <  then we find that the equilibrium mentioned 
in Proposition 2 is the unique equilibrium. 
  The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose
* p p <  and  l c  and  h c  are less than  3
2 5 − c . If the difference 
between  l c  and  h c  is sufficiently large then we have unique equilibrium where firm 2 
licenses its technology only if it has a technology corresponding to  l c .  
  
2.3 Implications  on  welfare 
 
It is easy to understand that this possibility of asymmetric information may increase 
social welfare
6 by increasing the incentive for licensing. As we have mentioned in our 
above analysis, technology licensing will not take place when the cost of production of 
the technologically superior firm is less than  3
2 5 − c . Hence, under complete information, 
firms will produce with their own technology. But, in case of incomplete information, 
the technologically superior firm will license its technology if its cost is  l c  and both 
firms cost of production will be  l c . Therefore, if cost of production of firm 2 is  l c  then 
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6 We define social welfare as the summation of industry profit and consumer surplus.  9
From (10) and (11) we find that (11) is always greater than (10). Hence, 
licensing under asymmetric information helps to increase social welfare by increasing 
cost efficiency in the economy. However, if firm 2 has the technology corresponding to 
h c  then welfare is same under complete information and asymmetric information. 
Therefore, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose  l c  and  h c  are less than  3
2 5 − c  and the difference between  l c  and 
h c  is sufficiently large so that firm 2 having the technology corresponding to  l c  
licenses its technology. Hence, welfare is under asymmetric information is non-




The literature on technology licensing has shown that when imitation is easy then 
technology licensing takes place if the technologies of the licenser and the licensee are 
sufficiently close. Therefore, if the technological superiority is sufficiently large then we 
will not expect technology licensing while we will expect licensing when technological 
superiority is sufficiently small. 
  In this paper we show that this result could be reversed when the role of 
licensing is to eliminate the problem of asymmetric information about the quality of 
technology. We show that it may be possible that a firm will license its technology when 
it has relatively higher technological superiority but will not license if it has relatively 
lower technological superiority. Thus, we show that the problem of asymmetric 
information about the quality of technology may create an upward bias on technology 
licensing. Since the problem of asymmetric information increases the incentive for 
technology licensing, we find that welfare may be higher under incomplete information 
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